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THE NEW GENERAL CODE FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
SUPREME COURT RULES INTERPRETED1
CARL C. WHEATON*
OBJECTIVES OF CODE
The purpose of our new code is to simplify and liberalize procedure,
to the end that litigation shall be expedited and justice be administered with
a minimum of technical procedural hindrance. It is the privilege of bur
appellate courts to construe its provisions so as to permit the accomplish-
ment of the purpose so earnestly sought by its authors.2
Section 2 of the code provides that the code shall be construed to secure,
among other things, the just determination of every action. Only in ex-
ceptional circumstances could an action be justly disposed of by dismissing
a meritorious appeal. The spirit of the new civil code undoubtedly is to
dispose of appealed causes on their merits unless delinquency in the pro-
cedural steps to appeal have been too grave to condone.3
The provision in Section 2 that it "shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action" does not mean
that courts are to adopt a construction of the code clearly not warranted
by the language of the legislature. If the view was adopted that the falsity
of a sheriff's return may be attacked and nullified, it would make it easy
for attacks to be made upon the solemn final judgments of courts. This
would encourage delay in the trial of causes on their merits while the courts
attempted to deal with questions of alleged false returns of service. Such
procedure, instead of contributing to the speedy and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action, would unsettle and make judgments uncertain
and unstable. It would really delay and make more expensive the processes
of the administration of justice.4
CASES COVERED BY THE CODE
Our General Code for Civil Procedure governs "the procedure in the
supreme court, court of appeals, circuit courts and common pleas courts.'
5
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. 1911, Leland Stanford Uni-
versity, LL.B., 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
1. These interpretations are based on Volumes 202 through 208 of South-
western Reporter, second series.
2. John A. Moore and Co., Inc., v. McConkey, 203 S.W. 2d 512 (Mo.
App. 1947).
3. Lieffring v. Birt, 356 Mo. 1092, 204 S.W. 2d 935 (1947).
4. Anthony v. Downs Amusement Co., 205 S.W. 2d 925 (Mo. App. 1947).
5. Lieffring v. Birt, supra note 3. See Section 2 of the code.
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It applies to all civil actions in law or in equity, unless a special procedure
statute makes provision for a different -procedure. Thus, since there is no
requirement in Article 7 of Chapter 8 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri
on injunctions that a motion for a new trial or a motion to set aside a
judgment shall be filed within the term to which it was entered, nor any
other procedural act required to be done within a time measured by a term
or terms of court, the civil code supplanted the* previous procedure and
the defendants have ten days in which to file a rfiotion for a new trial,
Section '116 of the civil code, and the trial court, under Section 119, has
thirty days after the entry within which it may on its own initiative grant
a new trial." Further there being no specific piovision respecting requests
for peremptory instructions or demurrers to the evidence in the article
relating to Garnishment precedure, our new procedure code, by Section 2,
supplanted the former procedure and made its Section 113 applicable.1
But in a divorce proceeding the mandatory provisions of Section 73
of the code are not applicable. The reason is that Section 2 of the new
code provides that it shall govern the procedure in the circuit courts in all
suits and proceedings of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law
or in equity, "unless otherwise provided by law. . . ." The quoted clause
means to exclude "Particular Actions" which have a special statutory
procedure that is inconsistent with the new general code.
Section 1516 of the divorce code authorizes a defendant to plead facts
which will defeat the plaintiff's right to a divorce and, in addition, if
desired, to file a cross-bill seeking a divorce, but it does not make it manda-
tory that a defendant file a cross-bill for divorce. If Section 73, providing
for compulsory counterclaims, were applicable in this case, it would com-
pletely destroy the option given to a defendant by the divorce code merely
to deny the plaintiff's allegations or to plead further in a cross-petition for
divorce and would de~troiy the right of a wife merely to defend against
her husband's divorce petition without pleading or forfeiting her right to
separate miaintenance. Any provision of the general code that would compel
the defendant in the divorce case to elect in such action between any cause
he or she may have for divorce and any cause of action the wife may
have for separate maintenance, and which would cause a forfeiture of
6. J. J. Newberry Co. v. Baker, 205 S.W. 2d 935 (Mo. App. 1947). See
also Supreme Court Rule 3.02(c).
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either or both not so elected, would be inconsistent with the provisions in
Section 2 of the new code, "unless otherwise provided by law." Being in-
consistent with and destructive of a special procedural statute, Section 2
excludes Section, 73 from any application to the pleadings in a divorce
proceeding.%
Also, the board of regents of a state teachers college, in summoning
owners of land which the board sought to condemn for a students' dormitory
project, appropriately followed the statutory procedure for the appropria-
tion of land for telegraph, telephone, or railroad rights of way, as au-
thorized by the statute under which the condemnation proceeding was
brought, rather than civil code provision allowing a longer time for the
filing of an answer after the service of summons, since the special statute
had a different provision in relation to service than.did the general codef
Where it was contended that the trial court had no authority to grant
a new trial because of Section 118 of our new code since the plaintiff's
motion, which was .filed in Deceiber 1944 (before the effective date of the
new code), was not passed on within 90 days thereafter, it was held that
the new code contained no requirement limiting the sustaining of a pre-
viously filed motion for a new trial to 90 days after its effective date;
and that Section 3 thereof gave the court the power in all actions then
pending to apply the former procedure, in a particular action pending, when,
in its opinion, the application of the new code thereto would not be feasible
or work injustice. It was further held that, by exercising its authority
to consider the pending motion under the old code, it would be deemed
to have been of said opinion and to have continued the application of
the old procedure. Appellants said that the motion herein was argued
and taken under advisement within 90 days after the effective date of
the new code, and was later required to be re-argued before it was sus-
tained. This would support the conclusion that the court was continuing
to apply the old procedure. Since the new code made no provision for the
application of Section 118 to pending motions for a new trial, such an
application of it, more than 90 days after its effective date, would have
worked injustice in many cases because parties could not have known
when the time for appeal would expire in such cases. Thus the right of
appeal might have been lost in many pending cases by such a later strict
8. Fawkes v. Fawkes, 204 S.W. 2d 132 (Mo. App. 1947).
9. Board of Regents for Northeast Missouri State Teachers College v.
Palmer, 356 Mo. 946, 204 S.W. 2d 291 (1947).
3
Wheaton: Wheaton: New General Code
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
interpretation and application of this section. Therefore, the construction
of Section 3 above referred to was correct and in accordance with the spirit
and purpose of the new code to decide cases on the merits, whenever
possible, instead of upon procedural technicalities. 0
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTIONS IN LAW AND EQUITY
It is abstractly true that there is no longer any procedural distinction
between suits in equity and actions at law in so far as ordinary procedure
is concerned. But, to say that all distinction between an action in equity
and an action at law has been eliminated is error. Section 4 of the new
code is in effect the same as Section 847 of the Revised Statutes of 1939,
which was first enacted one hundred years ago. It is fundamental that a
litigant cannot proceed by way of an equitable action to enforce a strictly
legal demand, nor can he proceed in an action at law to enforce a strictly
equitable right."
COMPUTING PERIODS OF TIME
Where a notice of appeal was filed on December 16, 1946, the appel-
lants had until March 17, 1947, to file the transcript on appeal in the
circuit court, as the end of the 90 day period fell on Sunday and the fol-
lowing day, or March 17, 1947, would have been timely in that court.'
2
The law, however, does not permit the exclusion of Sundays or holidays
except in cases where the last day happens to fall on such a day. 8
EXTENDING THE TIME FOR DOING SPECIFIED AcTs
The trial court may extend! the time for filing a transcript, upon
application, for "cause shown," if made before the expiration of the 90
days, and afterwards upon motion and a showing that the failure to file
it was the result of "excusable neglect."' 4 But the Supreme Court, under
authority of Section 10 of the general code, has provided by Rule 3.26:
"The trial -court shall not extend the time for filing the transcript on
appeal for a longer period than six months from the date the notice of
appeal is filed in the trial court."15 Moreover, Section 6(b) of the civil
procedure code of Missouri provides that the court "may not enlarge
10. Teague v. Plaza Express Co., 356 Mo. 1186, 205 S.W. 2d 563 (1947).
11. Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co.; 206 S.W. 2d 991 (Mo. App.
1947).
12. Rubinstein v. City of Salem, 204 S.W. 2d 502 (Mo. App. 1947).
13. See Section 6(a) of the code. Taylor v. Greer, 206 S.W. 2d 349 (Mo.
1947).
14. Bailey v. City of Charleston, 204 S.W. 2d 500 (Mo. App. 1947).
15. Mueller v. Burchfield, 207 S.W. 2d 546 (Mo. App. 1948).
[Vol. 13
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the period for filing a motion for or granting a new trial, or 'for com-
mencing an action or taking an appeal as provided by this code."'16
PARTIES
a. Joinder of
A truck passenger may join owners and operators of both the' truck
and the streetcar as parties defendant in an action for injuries sustained
in a collision between a truck and a streetcar allegedly resulting from
the negligence of all the defendants7I
Interpleader is an equitable remedy, existing independent of statute.
As such it depends upon and, requires the existence of the four following
elements, which may be regarded as its essential conditions: 1) The
same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties
against whom the relief is demanded; 2) all their adverse title or claims
must be dependent, or be derived from a common source; 3) the person
asking the relief must not have or claim any interest in the subject mat-
ter; 4) he must have incurred no independent liability to either of the
claimants, that is, he must stand perfectly indifferent between them,
in the position of a stakeholder.
However, our legislature has by enactment of the General Code for
Civil Procedure enlarged the scope of bills of interpleader, ahd has liberal-
ized the law on this subject. Section 18 completely abolishes condition 2
above, and also permits a plaintiff to deny liability, in whole or in part,
to any or all of the defendants, thus broadening and liberalizing the
remedy in regard to conditions 3 and 4. The crucial test of the right to
maintain a bill of interpleader is that the plaintiff should be possessed of
money or property which he owes, if money, to some one else, or, which,
if property, belongs to some one else, and which is claimed by defendants
or some of them, and, by reason of diverse claims of defendants or of some
of them, the plaintiff has a reasonable bona fide doubt, either growing out
of a question of law or of fact, as to which one of the rival claimants is
legally entitled thereto.1 8
b. Third-Party Practice
Section 20(a) of the civil code, in part permits the defendant in an
action, by leave of court, to file a petition against a third party "who is
16. Camden v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 206 S.W. 2d 699 (Mo. App. 1947).
17. Ibid.
18. John A. Moore and Co., Inc. v. McConkey, supra note 2.
5
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or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him." 19 But the right of a defendant to file such a petition is
to be exercised only against "a person not a party to the action.' '20
c. Intervention
Since paragraph (a) of Section 21 gives an absolute right to inter-
vene to a person who brings himself within the terms of this paragraph, the
trial court has no. discretion in the matter. If a trial court should wrong-
fully deny a person application to intervene, the court can be compelled
to permit intervention. The proper remedy for an applicant having a legal
right to' intervene, but who is denied this right by the trial court, is
mandamus. Under this paragraph application to intervene must be timely.
If one may' not be adequately represented by the parties to an
action and if he may be bound by the judgment therein, he is brought
within provision (2) of paragraph (a).21
d. Substitution of
Section 22 of the civil procedure code in Subsection (a)(1) thereof
deals with situations where a party to an action dies "and the claim is
not thereby extinguished." In such a case the "successors or representa-
tives" of the deceased, or "any party" to the action, have a right under
Section 22 to make a timely motion for substitution of a proper party
plaintiff for and in lieu of the deceased party. Subdivision (a)(1) of Sec-
tion 22 plainly states that "the motion for substitution may be made by
the successors or representatives of the deceased party or by any party."
Subsection (a)(3) of Section 22 of the code in the last sentence
thereof specifically provides that "if death occurs after appeal and before
final determination thereof and substitution on motion therefor is not
made within one year after the death, the appeal shall be dismissed as to
the deceased party." Supreme Court Rule 3.08 and the statute referred
to do not require an appellate court to set aside the judgment obtained
by a deceased plaintiff, if substitution is not requested within a year after
his death. There is nothing in the statutes which would permit an appel-
late court to do so.
19. Thomas J. Johnson & Co. v. Mueller, 356 Mo. 1109, 205 S.W. 2d 521
(1947).
20. Camden v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 16.
21. State ex* rel. Duggan v. Kirkwood, 208 S.W. 2d 257 (Mo. 1948).
6
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The word any, as used in the statute is all comprehensive, is not
modified by the context, and includes all who were parties to the suit.
It is the equivalent of "every" and "all," and means all or any party to
the action. One must read the statute and rule together. They authorize
and permit the motion for substitution to be made not only by the suc-
cessors or representatives of the deceased party, but by any party. If the
motion for substitution is not made within one year by some one of these
parties the appeal shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
22
INSTITUTION OF SUITS
An attorney employed on a contingent fee contract does not, by nego-
tiating for a settlement of the claim, "commence an action" within mean-
ing of code section providing for an attorney's lien for compensation after
commencement of an "action.1123
SERVICE OF SUMMONS
While it is true that the article on election contests is a code unto
itself, nevertheless the notice of contest and the service thereof take the
place of the petition and summons in the ordinary case, and Section 24
of the general code of civil procedure requires service of summons to be
by the sheriff or a person specially appointed. Section 2 of the new article,
so far as concerns the notice of contest and service thereof, is the same
as old Section 11632, and, since the construction of Section 11632 was,
at the time of the enactment of the new article, that the notice of contest
could not be lawfully served by an individual, the presumption obtains that
the legislature, in adopting Section 2, intended to adopt the construction
theretofore given.
Service of notice of an election contest is, therefore, insufficient if it is




The office of the pleadings is to define and to isolate the issues to
those controverted so as to advise the trial court and the parties of the
issues to be tried and to expedite the trial of a cause on the merits, hence
22. Wornington v. City of Monett, 356 Mo. 875, 20- S.W. 2d 264 (1947).
23. Orr v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 207 S.W. 2d 511 (Mo.
App. 1947).
24. Messick v. Grainger, 356 Mo. 1227, 205 S.W. 2d 739 (1947).
7
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the absence of a formal pleading traversing the allegations of the answer
should not be considered prejudicial to a party defendant who under-
stood what issues were being tried. For example, where issues are dis-
cussed and analyzed by the trial court, and the parties, before the court
rules on the defendant's motion for judgment on pleadings, and prior to
the trial of case, proceed on the theory that the plaintiff has denied the
allegations of the defendant's answer, even if the answer is a cross-claim,
the plaintiff's failure to file an answer to it does not entitle the defendant
to a judgment on the pleadings. 25
b. Joinder of Claims
Section 37 of the General Code for Civil Procedure is applicable to the
pleadings in cases provided for both in Chapter 8 on "Divorce" (Section
1515), and Chapter 21 on "Married Women" (Section 3382) of the Re-
vised Statutes of Missouri 1939, since each states that like process and
proceedings shall be had in such cases as in other civil suits. This means
that, except so far as such two chapters specifically prescribe matters of
pleading and procedure, the general code applies. For example, modes of
service of process, time for pleading, kinds of motions permitted, periods
required for notice, provision for amendments, and the like, applicable
to other civil actions, apply to suits for divorce or for separate maintenance.
Therefore, the specific limitation in Section 2 of the new code declaring
it* to be inapplicable when "otherwise provided by law," means that,
to such extent as such other provisions of the law do not extend or con-
flict, the provisions of the code will apply. In other words, the general
code does apply to suits for divorce and separate maintenance, except only
when conflicting with other laws on the subject. However, Section 37 does
not conflict with other provisions of the law pertaining to divorce and
separate maintenance since it merely permits, if the defendant so chooses,
that claims not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence on which
the petition is based, or any claim the defendant may have against the
plaintiff, -may be pleaded. This principle is verified and clarified by
Supreme Court Rule 3.16 authorizing the pleading of any matured claim
against the adverse party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the adverse party's petition, when such claim
or counterclaim existed at the time the first pleading was required. This
rule was made supplemental to Section 37 and other sections noted. Thus,
25. Linders v. Linders, 356 Mo. 852, 204 S.W. 2d 229 (1947).
[Vol. 13
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under Section 37 a wife who is sued for divorce may or may not, as she
may elect, and without forfeiture of any claim, merely deny her husband's
allegations, or she may also file a cross-petition for divorce (Section
1516), or one for a separate maintenance (Section 3376).
The reason our courts have heretofore held that an action for main-
tenance could not be pleaded as a counterclaim in a divorce suit was tfat
they were independent causes of action and did not seek the same relief,
and that Section 917 (joinder of causes of action) and Section 929 (actions
which could be pleaded as a counterclaim) of the Revised Statutes were
so limited that they did not permit such a joinder. But that reasoning
has now been abrogated by new Section 37, which permits independent
actions to be joined in the petition or in a counterclaim. They need not
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series thereof, and a
common question of law or fact need not exist. They may. include both
contract and tort claims; may be legal or equitable; and may be joined
as independent or alternate claims.
However, Section 37 of the new code permits, but does not require,
a defendant- in his answer, by way of a counterclaim, to join either as
independent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal br equitable
as he has against the plaintiff.26
c. Incapacity of a Party to Sue
The authority of the board of regents of a state teachers' college
to initiate an action must be raised by specific averments in the pleadings.27
d. Denial of Performance of Conditions Precedent
Recoupment is a defense based upon new matter not included among
the matters necessary to make out the plaintiff's cause of action. By
such a defense the defendant does not deny the contract and the plaintiff's
performance under it, but ,by proof of defective performance he seeks to
avoid his liability to the plaintiff for payment of the agreed price. In
view of the nature of the defense as one in confession and avoidance, the
authorities hold that "in an action to recover the contract price agreed to
be paid for work and materials, defendant cannot show that the work was
done in an unworkmanlike manner, unless he has pleaded such defense.' '2
26. Fawkes v. Fawkes, supra note 8.
27. Board of Regents for Northeast Missouri State Teachers' College v.
Palmer, .upra note 9.
28. Brush v. Miller, 208 S.W. 2d 816 (Mo. App. 1948).
9
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e. Special Damages
Failure to object to the lack of the pleading of special damages waives
such a defect.29
Section 52 of the general code, has no application to a proceeding
under the wrongful death statutes.30
f. Times Within Which to File Pleadings
A court has the inherent power, of its own motion, to strike a pleading
filed out of time, because such power is necessary for the court to bring
about the orderly and expeditious transaction of such businesses as may
be brought before it, the very purpose of its existence. 3'
g. Admittance of Averments in Pleadings
By his default a defendant admits the truth of the allegations of
the petition constituting the plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's
liability thereunder; but he does not admit the amount of damages
claimed.3 2
h. Counterclaims
Section 73 of the new procedure code does not apply to a counterclaim
which has not accrued by the time the defendant files his answer.
33
i. Cross-Claims
Where a streetcar company was sued jointly with truck owners for
injuries sustained by the truck passenger in a collision between a street-
car and the truck, it could file a cross-claim against the truck owners and
thereby assurie itself of an adjudication as to the liability as between
itself and the truck owners, though the plaintiff dismissed as to the truck
owners after their motion for a new trial was sustained and judgment
had become final against the streetcar company.34
j. Amendments to Plezdings
Courts are liberal in allowing amendments where the cause of action
is not totally changed, and rules providing for amendment would be use-
29. Spalding v. Robertson, 206 S.W. 2d 517 (Mo. 1947).
30. Ibid.
31. Oliver v. Scott, 208 S.W. 2d 468 (Mo. App. 1948). See also Section 58
of the General Code for Civil Procedure.
32. Ibid. See also Section 41 of the General Code for Civil Procedure.
33. Niedringhaus v. Zucker, 208 S.W. 2d 211 (Mo. 1948).
34. Camden v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 16.
[Vol. 13
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less if petitions, in the first instance, must state perfect and complete
causes of action35
In an action for breach of contract which provided that the plaintiffs
should convey realty to the defendant, subject to a trust deed, and that,
if a purchaser was found by the plaintiffs within five years, the latter
were to receive the purchase price less the amount of the incumbrance,
permitting a pleading alleging that the effective date of conveyance was
October 9, 1935, to be amended at the close of all the evidence to change
the date to February 17, 1936, was proper over the objection that the
amendment changed the cause of action. 6
A pleader should be allowed a reasonable time or opportunity to
amend.3 7
The circuit court being one of general jurisdiction, there is always
a presumption of right action, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Therefore, though a transcript does not show any action taken by a court
upon a motion to strike, or any objection to the court's failure to rule on
it, if in fact it did so, it must be assumed that the amended answer was
filed by leave of the court, where, on the same day that it was filed, a trial
was had without any objection being made by any one.38
An original petition is abandoned when an amended petition is filed.39
AMENDMENTS TO RETU NS
A reasonable construction of the language of Section 31 of the new
procedure code leads inescapably to the view that it was the legislative
intent to authorize the court to "allow" an amendment to a sheriff's return
on the motion of the, sheriff, or of a party, so as to cure an "insufficiency,"
and thus avoid unnecessary delay. However, the curing of an "insufficiency"
of a sheriff's return by an allowed "amendment," in order to avoid delays
on technical grounds, is far different from a ruling by a court completely
setting aside a final judgment on the ground that a sheriff's return is "false."
That cannot be done.
If a sheriff makes a false return, a defendant has a complete and defi-
nite remedy by bringing an action for damages against him on his official
35. Campbell v. Webb, 356 Mo. 466, 202 S.W. 2d 35 (1947).
36. Ibid.
37. Edwards v. Sittner, 206 S.W. 2d 578 (Mo. App. 1947).
38. Warren v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 205 S.W. 2d 744 (Mo. App.
1947).
39. Locasio v. Ford Motor Co., 203 S.W. 2d 518 (Mo. App. 1947).
11
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bond. Each sheriff of this state is required by law to give a substantial
bond to protect the public against any such misconduct as a false return .4
MOTIONS
a. Speaking Motions
Under our new procedure code a motion, in a proper situation, may
perform the function of a "speaking demurrer." Such a motion might, not
improperly, be referred to as a "speaking motion," since demurrers are no
longer recognized by that name.41
b. Motions to Dismiss Petitions
A defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff"s petition in an action
to recover for breach by the employer of an employment contract.
The defendant's motion contained detailed allegations covering the
existence and the terms of the grievance procedure which, it said, was
specifically provided for in the contract. However, the contract itself
was not set 6ut in the motion, nor was a copy thereof attached. No evi-
dence was received in support of the motion. That part of the contract
which, defendant contended, required submission of any dispute over
application of seniority rule; was not set out in the motion. At most,
defendant merely pleaded its conclusion, to the effect that submission to
the grievance procedure was a condition precedent to filing this suit. It
pleaded no provision of the contract wherein such procedure was stated
or required.
None of the pleadings contained averments of facts showing the exist-
ence and provisions of a grievance procedure. It was held that, absent an
allegation in the petition of facts amounting to an admission of the
existence of a "grievance procedure" in the contract, and of a provision
requiring resort thereto prior to institution of suit, or of such allegations,
and proof thereof, in the motion, the defendant's motion must fail in its
entirety.4
2
c. Motion for More Definite Statement or for Bill of Particulars
The defendant may ask for a more definite statement or for a bill of
particulars of any matter contained in the petition under Section 63 of the
General Code for Civil Procedure. 43 However, he will be deemed, under
40. Anthony v. Downs Amusement Co., supra note 4.
41. Locasio v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 39.
42. Ibid.
12
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Section 66 of that code, to have waived such objection to the petition by
failing to file a motion requesting such a statement or bill."
d. Untimely Motion, Effect of
Refusal to strike a mere conclusion of law alleged in an answer is not
error where the plaintiff, by an untimely motion to strike, had waived
objections to the answer, other than failure of the answer to set forth
a legal defense."
e. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Ordinarily, if an issue of fact is presented by the pleadings, a motion
for judgment on the pleadings slould be denied. However, a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is not required to be denied because there exists
an issue of fact presented by pleadings respecting the value of the
attorney's fees in a suit on a life policy, where the trial court held, as a
matter of law, that the plaintiff was not entitled to an attorney's fee. A
request therefor could be treated as surplusage. A request for a specific
judgment on the pleadings, rather than a request for a judgment for
such an amount as the pleadings show the plaintiff entitled to, should be
treated' as surplusage, and the motion treated as a motion for judgment
for such sum as the pleadings show plaintiff entitled to.4 6
TRIAL OF ISSUES NOT RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS
Under the broad provisions of Section 82 of the General Code for
Civil Procedure, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all re-
spects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 47 But it is only where an
issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the express or implied consent
of the parties that such an issue is to be treated as though it had been
raised in the pleadings."
INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatories are only a less formal and less expensive way of ascer-
taining facts than by depositions, and the scope of examination on interroga-
43. Page v. Wabash Railroad Co., 206 S.W. 2d 691 (Mo. App. 1947); Kreis-
man v. Komfeld, 208 S.W. 2d 79 (Mo. App. 1948).
44. Kreisman v. Kornfeld, iupra note 43.
45. Oldham v. Siegfried, 202 S.W. 2d 132 (Mo. App. 1947).
46. Hall v. Missouri Insurance Co., 208 S.W. 2d 830 (Mo. App. 1948). See
Section 68 of the General Code for Civil Procedure.
47. Campbell v. Webb, supra note 35; supra note 43. Duffy v. Barnhart
Store Co., 202 S.W. 2d 520 (Mo. App. 1947); Brackmann v. Brackmann, 202
S.W. 2d 561 (Mo. App. 1947).
48. Brush v. Miller, 208 S.W. 2d 816 (Mo. App. 1948).
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tories is merely coextensive with that permitted by depositions, and does
not go beyond it to authorize the discovery of matters not admissible in
evidence which might aid in the party's preparation for trial. It necessarily
follows, therefore, that, since the extent of a plaintiff's discovery has not
been augmented by the provision in the new code for the use ofinterroga-
tories, the fact that a plaintiff may employ interrogatories affects only his
possible method of discovery, and does not enlarge his right to obtain the
names of the particular witnesses nor afford him a right which he would
not otherwise have possessed. 49
The identity of persons known by the driver of a bus (or by the police
officer acting for him) to have been present at a casualty by being found
then and there on the bus at the very time is a proper subject for dis-
covery on interrogatories. 50 'On the other hand, if the operator gets names
of persons in a street who are not "known by him to have been present at
the time and place of the casualty," there is no duty to disclose their
identity.51
CONTINUANCES
Counsel Member of General Assembly
Where the plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer action in justice (now
magistrate) court filed a certified application for a continuance, specifying
that one of their attorneys was in actual attendance at the assembly, and
that his appearance at the trial was necessary to a fair and proper trial
within the meaning of Section 96 of the procedure code, justice's action in
proceeding with the trial was in excess of its jurisdiction, and prohibition
was a proper remedy to restrain the justice from issuing an execution
on the judgment rendered by him after denying a continuance.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Hyde said:
"I concur in the opinion of LEEDY, J., that it was proper to
enforce prohibition under the circumstances of this case. There
was no question raised as to the validity of Section 96 of the
Civil Code ... and the sufficiency of the application and affidavit
for continuance was admitted. However, if we are to continue to
apply the drastic remedy of prohibition to rulings on applica-
tions for continuance under this statute, I think there should
49. Belding v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 205 S.W. 2d 866 (Mo. App.
1947).
50. Ibid. Accord: State v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674, 203 S.W. 2d 407 (1947).
51. State v. Cowan, supra note 50.
(Vol. 13
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be some further consideration of the question of the construction
and meaning of the requirements of this section.
"This statute says: "When the general assembly is in session,
it shall be a sufficient cause for a continuance if it shall appear
to the court, by affidavit, that any party applying for such contin-
uance, or any attorney, solicitor or counsel of such party is a
member of either hoiise of the general assembly, and in actual
attendance on the session of the same, and that the attendance
of such party, attorney, solicitor or 'counsel is necessary to a fair
and proper trial or other proceedings in such suit.'
"I do not think that it can properly be held that the con-
clusion 'that the attendance of such party, attorney, solicitor or
counsel is necessary to a fair and proper trial' does 'appear to
the court,' merely when this statutory language is written into
an affidavit. I think that this section must be read and con-
strued in connection with Section 93 . . . which says: 'Every ap-
plication . .. shall. . . be ... accompanied by the affidavit . . . set-
ting forth the facts on which the application is founded.' This
surely does not mean conclusions which the court must reach in
order to find that the applicant is entitled to a continuance.
Such a construction would transfer the judicial discretion of the
courts to litigants, or their counsel, and make the matter of a
continuance depend upon their mere whim or desire.
"The rule is stated in 17 C. J. S. 259, Continuances, § 94, that
'in stating the grounds on which a continuance is asked, the
affidavit should set forth facts constituting such grounds, and mere
conclusions are insufficient.' See also 12 AM. JUR. 472, § 31;
Gregory v. Hanson, Mo. App., 224 S. W. 82. Therefore, I think
that the meaning of Section 96 (in saying a party has sufficient
cause for a continuance 'if it shall appear to the court ... that the
attendance of such party, attorney, solicitor or counsel is necessary
to a fair and proper trial') necessarily must be that the affidavit
must state facts which would support such a finding and from
which the court could reach such a conclusion. I think that
State v. Myers, 352 Mo. 735, 179 S. W. 2d 72, making a con-
trary construction should be overruled.
"I think that any other construction would make this statute
unconstitutional. We have held that an act which arbitrarily
imposes an unreasonable or unnecessary delay upon the admin-
istration of justice would be contrary to Section 10, Article II,
Const. of 1875, now Section 14, Article I, Const. of 1945, Mo.
R. S. A. Kristanik v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 335 Mo. 60, 70 S. W.
2d 890. Also as stated, 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, § 128,
p. 329, the Legislature cannot entirely exclude the exercise of the
15
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discretion of the Court. To do so is an encroachment of one
department of Government upon the functions of another, pro-
hibited by Article III, Const. of 1875, now Article II, Const.
of 1945.
"Section 96 provides for a complete moratorium (except
during periods of adjournment of 20 days or more) on all pro-
ceedings in any pending case during the sessions of the General
Assembly (which may be continuous under the new constitution
throughout the whole period of each biennium) on the applica-
cation of any party or attorney therein who is a, member. It
very properly states certain facts which must be shown by
affidavit but does include the one matter (necessity of attendance
to a fair and proper trial) which can only be a conclusion. If
the court is not permitted to determine this issue, which it could
only do from a consideration of some facts about the case and
the situation of the parties and attorneys, then its decision is
arbitrarily compelled merely by the conclusion stated by the
party making the affidavit regardless of what justice to others
may require. Such a construction takes away all the judicial
function of the court in making continuances applied for under
this section. Certainly litigants and lawyers who are members of
the General Assembly should be given every reasonable consid-
eration and their rights carefully protected by the Courts. They
have duties as important as any in our Government; and they
are required to perform them away from their homes at great
personal sacrifice of both time and money because of inadequate
compensation. This court has demonstrated that it will protect
their rights by prohibition if necessary. However, our constitu-
tion requires the courts to protect the rights of all parties (espe-
cially to see that 'justice shall be administered without . . .
denial or delay'); and there can be abuse of this continuance
statute (although such instances are very rare) if it is construed
to compel an indefinite continuance in every case under all cir-
cumstances. I do not think it should be so construed."
Judges Clark, Douglas, and Ellison, concurred in Judge Hyde's
opinion.52
52. Kyger v. Koerper, 355 Mo. 772, 207 S.W. 2d 46 (1946). In accord:
State v. Knight, 356 Mo. 1233, 206 S.W. 2d 330 (1947). For cases in which
it was held that, at the time of trial, enough time had elapsed after adjournment
of the legislature not to permit a continuance under Section 96 of the procedure
code, see State v. Grove, 204 S.W. 2d 757 (Mo. 1947); State v. Bryant, 356 Mo.
1223, 205 S.W. 2d 732 (1947), and State v. Knight, supra this note.
[Vol. 13
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1948], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/2
1948] WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1947 449
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
Whilb the right of trial by jury is to be preserved to the parties in-
violate, the action of a court in declaring the legal effect of- undisputed
evidence is not a denial of the right to trial by jury53
DISMISSALS
In a divorce suit, the defendant has the right to dismiss a cross-bill
without notice to the plaintiff.5 4
The right of the plaintiff to dismiss exists where the trial court has
set aside the verdict and the judgment as to the defendant and has
granted him a new trial. The cause is then pending awaiting such new
trial. The cause has not only not been submitted to th6 jury, but
the trial court has not even been commenced. Therefore, Section
99(a) of the General Code for Civil Procedure, which gives a plaintiff
the right to dismiss at any time before finally submitting the case to the
jury, makes it possible and proper for the plaintiff to dismiss the cause as
to the defendant at any time before fianlly submitting it to the jury.P5
Involuntary dismissals for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue
are to be dismissals without prejudice.56
Under Section 101, where one of the judges of a trial court dismisses
without prejudice an action against two of the defendants for want of service
,of process, another judge had jurisdiction to permit the filing of an amended
petition against such defendants on whom service of process was had.
57
Where the defendant's counterclaim is dismissed for failure to state
facts which constitute a cause of action and not because the plaintiff has
dismissed his petition, Section 103 providing that no dismissal of a plain-
tiff's action shall operate to dismiss the counterclaim does not apply.5 8
INSTRUCTIONS
Sections 105 and 122 require the court to afford ample opportunity for
counsel to examine the instructions before the same are given and to make
objections to the same if they so desire, out of the hearing of the jury, and,
if objections are made, the objector must state his grounds therefor. He
53. Rowe v. Henwood, 207 S.W. 2d 829 (Mo. App. 1948). See Section
98 of the General Code for Civil Procedure.
54. Brackmann v. "Brackmapn, 202 S.W. 2d 561 (Mo. App. 1947).
55. Camden v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 16.
56. State ex rel. Thompson v. Terte, 207 S.W. 2d 487 (Mo. 1947).
57. Ibid.
58. Niedringhaus v. Zucker, supra note 33.
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cannot object for the first time on appeal. 9 Thus, the trial judge's oral
reply to a question put by a juror after submission of a case, as the jury
was leaving the courtroom, was not error where the judge informed counsel
of the incident and counsel made no objection or request. 0
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
Demurrers to the evidence and requests for peremptory instructions
are abolished and a motion for a directed verdict substituted therefor."1
A motion by a defendant for a directed verdict under Section 112
of the new civil code can be sustained only when the facts and the legit-
imate reasonable inferences therefrom are so strongly against the plaintiff
as to leave no room for reasonable minds to differ. In other words, in passing
upon such a motion for a directed verdict, the court is required to make
every reasonable inference of fact in favor of a plaintiff which a jury
might have inferred in his favor, and such motion should be suitained only
when the facts and inferences to be drawn from the evidence, considered
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, are so strongly against him as to
leave no room for reasonable minds to differ.62
The motion referred to in code Section 113 is directed against the verdict
and strikes at "any judgment entered thereon" as provided in said section;
i.e., an interlocutory judgment contemplated under Section 1567 and a final
judgment contemplated under Section 1579 of the Revised Statutes of Mis-
souri, 1939.63
A trial resulted in a verdict on May 16 against a garnishee, and the
court ordered the garnishee to pay the amount determined into the court
within -ten days. On May 24 the garnishee filed motions to set aside the
judgment, and on July 8, the garnishee having defaulted, judgment was
rendered against the garnishee. On July 9 the garnishee refiled its motion
for judgment in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict and
refiled' its motion for a new trial. The garnishee was held to have exercised
due diligence and- timely filed its motion striking at the verdict, interlocu-
tory judgment, and the final judgment. 4
59. Morrison v. Terry, 205 S.W. 2d 902 (Mo. App. 1947). In accord: E. C.
Robinson Lumber Co. v. Cottonseed Delinting Corp., 207 S.W. 2d 63 (Mo. App.
1947). See also Hensley v. Dorr, 202 S.W. 2d 553 (Mo. App. 1947).
60. Schonwald v. F. Burkart Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 435, 202 S.W. 2d 7 (1947).
61. Linenschmidt v. Continental Casualty Co., 356 Mo. 914, 204" S.W. 2d
295 (1947).
62. Panke v. Shannon, 207 S.W. 2d 854 (Mo. App. 1948).
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CASES TRIED WITHOUT A JURY
a. Declarations of Law
Declarations of law (in the form of instructions) are no longer neces-
sary in non-jury trials and they cannot be made the basis of allegations
of error on appeal. Instead, Section 114 of the procedure code provides
for review de novo on the whole record before the trial court "as in suits
of an equitable nature."65
b. Duties of Appellate Court
In reviewing on its merits the case tried without a jury, an appellate
court must follow the mandate of Section 114(d) of the procedure code
and "review the case upon both the law and the evidence as in suits of an
equitable nature." The judgment may not be set aside "unless clearly
erroneous," and due regard must be given to "the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."' ' 6
Reviewing a case as in equity means that the court can and will dis-
regard any incompetent testimony that may have been offered, so that if
it should find that any part of plaintiff's testimony was improperly ad-
mitted such evidence would be excluded from consideration.67
The rule that a reviewing court will normally defer to the findings
and conclusions of the trial judge on conflicting evidence does not apply
when it is obvious that the decree was induced by an erroneous view
of the law, and, in such case, the reviewing court will correct the error. 68
Section 114 has no application to a case which is submitted to a
jury.69
An award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission is now to be
regarded "as having more nearbyt-the force and effect of a judgment in a
non-jury case under the new Civil Code. ' 70
MOTION FOR NEw TRIAL
a. Form of
A motion for a new trial is not a nullity merely because the plaintiff
inadvertently failed to formally request the setting aside of the judgment
65. Landers v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 1169, 205 S.W. 2d 544 (1947).
66. Peters v. Jamison's Estate, 202 S.W. 2d 879 (Mo. 1947). In accord:
Geisinger v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 202 S.W. 2d 142 (Mo. App. 1947); Loeb v.
Viviano, 202 S.W. 2d 528 (Mo. App. 1947); Williamson~v. National Garage Co.,
203 S.W. 2d 126 (Mo. App. 1947); Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, 206 S.W. 2d 569
(Mo. 1947); Charles v. Charles, 208 S.W. 2d "476 (Mo. App. 1948).
67. Boggess v. Cunningham's Estate, 207 S.W. 2d 814 (Mo. App. 1948).
68. Boudinier v. Boudinier, 203 S.W. 2d 89 (Mo. App. 1947).
69. Oldham v. Siegfried, 202 S.W. 2d 132 (Mo. App. 1947).
70. Goetz v. J. D. Carson Co., 206 S.W. 2d 530 (Mo. 1947).
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as a preliminary to the prayer for a new trial in a case where neither
the successful party nor the court could have been in doubt as to the
grounds of the complaint or of the remedy sought.71
b. Timed within Which to Mizke Motion
A motion for a new trial shall be filed not later than ten days after
entry of judgment. 2
Matters raised in a motion for a new trial cannot be considered
on appeal after the motion is overruled where that motion was not filed
within the statutory time.73
c. When Judgment Entered
Section 116 of the General Code for Civil Procedure provides that
judgments are to be entered as of the day of the verdict and motions 'for
new trial are to be filed within ten days after entry of the judgment.74
Under that section a judgment becomes final at the expiration of
30 days after the entry of such judgment.75
d. Proof of Grounds for New Trial
Section 117 was not intended by the General Assembly as the exclu-
sive method of presenting proof of the existence of the grounds for a new
trial. Oral proof thereof mar also be given. 5
THE GRANTING OF NEW TRIALS
Stating Grounds for Granting New Trial
The trial court is required, by Sections 115 and 119 of the new civil
procedure code, to specify of record the ground or grounds on which a
new trial is granted. Such a court is not required to specify any particular
numbered assignment in the motion for a new trial, but merely to specify
the ground or grounds on which the new trial is granted, and such ground
or grounds so specified, unless the new trial is granted by the court of its
own initiative, should come within the purview of some assignment in
the motion for a new tria. 7
-71. Terry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo. App. 1947).
72. Taylor v. Greer, 206 S.W. 2d 349, (Mo. 1947).
73. State v. Henry, 205 S.W. 2d 743 (Mo. App. 1947).
74. Linenschmidt v. Continental Casualty Co., supra note 7; Lieffring v.
Birt, supra note 3.
75. Camden v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 16.
. 76. Wood v. Claussen, 207 S.W. 2d 802 (Mo. App. 1948).
77. Schreiner v. City of St. Louis, 203 S.W. 2d 678 (Mo. App. 1947).
(Vol. 13
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EXCEPTIONS TO RULINGS OF A COURT
If a party believes a court's ruling is incorrect and desires to pre-
serve the point for review on appeal, an objection to the ruling stating
the grounds thereof should be made at the time to give the trial court
an opportunity to change the ruling and correct the error, if it was error.
Having failed to make any such objection, the matter is not open for
consideration in an appellate court.78
A party moving for a directed verdict must make known to the court
"his grounds therefor," but the grounds need not in all events be stated
in the motion itself, for the code provision is sufficiently complied with
whether the grounds are actually incorporated in the motion, or whether
the record recites that they are orally brought to the court's attention at
the time. The practice which prevails in trial courts of affording counsel
an opportunity to be heard orally when a motion for a directed verdict is
made has been particularly commended.79
APPEAL
a. Grounds for Appeal
1. Statute Necessary
The right of appeal is statutory. 0
2. Judgments and Orders Appealable
An appeal must be from a final judgment or from an order or' judgment
specifically allowed by statute.8' In an action for a balance owing on a
written contract of purchase signed by'one defendant as purchaser and by
the other three defendants as sureties, dismissal of the cause as to one of
the defendant sureties with prejudice did not determine finally the cause
as to the remaining defendants and was not a "final judgment" which
would be appealable.8 2 ,
An order overruling a motion to declare void a judgment and decree
is not an appealable order under Section 126 of our code.82
78, Koeppel v. Koeppel, 208 S.W.'2d 929 (Mo. App. 1948).
79. Schubert v. St Louis Public Service Co., 206 S.W. 2d 708 (Mo. App.
1947).
80. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Rouse, 204 S.W. 2d 438 (Mo. App. 1947); Ed-
wards v. Sittner, supra note 37.
81. Edwards v. Sittner, supra note 37.
82. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Rouse, supra note 80. In accord in principle:
State ex rel. Thompson v. Terte, .nvpra note 56.
83. McIntosh v. Wiggins, 356 Mo. 926, 204 S.W. 2d 770 (1947).
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An order overruling a motion for a new trial was not an appealable
order.84
b. How Taken
1. Notice of Appeal
Though the filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional,8 such filing
is the only requirement necessary to invoke appellate jurisdiction."'
However, the filing of both a notice of appeal and an affidavit for
appeal does not invalidate the appeal. The affidavit is merely superfluous. 7
Strict adherence to the prescribed averments of the notice is not juris-
dictional; the averments should be liberally construed to permit appellate
review so long as an opposing party is not misled to his irreparable harm;
a notice of appeal which can reasonably be construed as an attempt in
good faith to appeal from a final judgment or appealable order is sufficient.
It is not fatal to an appeal that the appellant inadvertently used
language indicating that he sought an appeal from the action of the court
in overruling his motion for a new trial. The order overruling the motion
for a new trial had the effect of making the judgment final and appeal-
able; and it was this judgment which aggrieved him, and from which the
appeal was really taken.88
A notice of appeal stating that the appeal is taken "from the judg-
ment" is not insufficient.89
2. Bonds
(a) Supersedeas
An appeal from an order of a trial court modifying an original divorce
decree does not stay the execution of the order and judgment rendered
on the motion to modify, absent the giving of a supersedeas bond.90
(b) Cost
There is no authority making the filing of an appeal bond a pre-
requisite to the right of appeal. It is not within the spirit of the code
84. Gibson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 204 S.W. 2d 439 (Mo. App.
1947); Terry v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra note 71.
85. Ibid.
86. Whealen v. St. Louis Soft Ball Ass'n, 356 Mo. 622, 202 S.W. 2d 891(1947); State ex rel. Thompson v. Terte, supra note 56.
87. Vance v. Vance, 203 S.W. 2d 899 (Mo. App. 1947).
88. Terry v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra note 71; Gibson v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra note 84.
89. Wiley v. Stewart Sand and Material Co., 206 S.W. 2d 362 (Mo. App.
1947).
90. Ex parte Porter, 203 S.W. 2d 748 (Mo. App. 1947).
(Vol. 13
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that an appeal be dismissed for failure to post a bond for costs. The
supreme court and the courts of appeal shall, according to Section 135 (d)
of the code, have no power or authority to make or enforce any rule or
order requiring any party to an appeal to file a bond for costs in those
courts."'
3. Withdrawal of Appeal
The filing of a notice does not thereby divest the ,trial court of juris-
diction of a case. Under Supreme Court Rule 1.17, an appellant may
withdraw his appeal in the trial court any time prior to the filing of the
transcript on appeal in the appellate court, since an appeal is not finally
perfected until the transcript is filed in the appellate court. Under Section,
137 of the new code, the filing of the transcript on appeal transfers the
case to the appellate court.
Where the plaintiff did not file a transcript on appeal aild, when he
flied his amended petition in the trial court, he indicated he was abandon-
ing his appeal. Though it would have been more orderly practice for him
to have formally withdrawn his appeal, his failure to perform this precise
act did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction to permit him, to file his
amended petition.
9 2
4. Transcript of the Record
(a) Time within which to File
The transcript on appeal must be filed in the circuit court and the
action transferred to the appellate court "within 90 days from the date
of filing of the notice of appeal," or within a proper extension of time.
Otherwise a motion to dismiss will be granted. 3
(b) Contents
Appellants must according to Supreme Court Rule 1.08, distinctly
point out alleged errors, of the trial court, show that they were prejudiced,
and indicate where such rulings may be found in the printed abstract of
the record. The appellate court need not search the entire record for
errors.
An assignment of error that the court erred in admitting immaterial,
incompetent, and irrelevant evidence on the part of plaintiffs over the
91. Holmes v. McNeil, 356 Mo. 846, 204 S.W. 2d 303 (1947).
92. State ex rel. Thompson v. Terte, supra note 56.
93. Rubinstein v. City of Salem, supra note 12; Mueller v. Burchfield, supra
note 15.
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objection of defendant is not a sufficiently specific allegation of error to
conform with that rule.9 4
Where the appellant and respondent agree to the full transcript on
appeal prepared by the court reporter, the signature of the trial judge is
unnecessary.9 '
(c) Order for Further Record
Under Supreme Court Rule 1.03, permission is given, and any appel-
late court in Missouri is vested with a wide discretion, to require, or not
to require, the clerk of the trial court to send up any papers, documents,
or exhibits in any cause then pending on appeal in such appellate court.
Such discretion the appellate court may exercise to send for any portion
of the transcript inadvertently omitted, and thus prevent a miscarriage of
justice. It may, in the exercise of such discretion, refuse and decline to
make any requirement whatever of the clerk of the trial court. The ap-
pellate court may, in its discretion, refuse to permit counsel to supply the
deficiency in the transcript out of time. However, if the appellate court,
having exercised its discretion to call upon the clerk of the trial court to
supply a deficiency in the transcript, and such omission having been sup-
plied by such clerk, or supplied by counsel with the court's permission,
then has before it a full transcript, the appellate court then has sufficient
upon which to proceed upon the merits of the appeal.98
5. Briefs
(a) Fair and Concise Statement
The statement in a brief is "fair and concise,"' as required by Rule
1.08, where it is sufficient to give the court a clear understanding of the
issues to be decided.9 7
Though a brief does not specifically state that the jurisdiction of the
court of appeals is invoked because the judgment is for an amount less
than $7,500, if it recites that the judgment appealed from is for $500, this
is sufficient to inform the court, of the ground for invoking its jurisdiction,
although it is better practice to state the basis of the appeal to the court
in a separate paragraph at the very inception of the brief.1s
94. Esker v. Davis, 207 S.W. 2d 798 (Mo. App. 1948).
95. Bailey v. City of Charleston, 204 S.W. 2d 500 (Mo. App. 1947).
96. Lieffring v. Birt, supra note 3; In accord: Whealen v. St. Louis Soft
Ball Association, supra note 86; Gibson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra
note 84.
97. Wiley.v. Stewart Sand and Material Co., supra note 89.
98. Leath v. Weaver, 202 S.W. 2d 125 (Mo. App. 1947).
[Vol. 13
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(b) Dismissal for Lack of Insufficiency of Brief
Where the appellant filed no brief the appeal was dismissed. 9 How-
ever, though the plaintiff's brief does not fully comply with the rules,
,inasmuch as the action involved the care and custody of a minor child
in whose welfare the estate is concerned, it was held that the interests of
justice required that the appeal be not dismissed for failure to comply
with the rules.100
Considering the plaintiff's brief on appeal and the record which was
short, it was held that the inconvenience caused by plaintiff's failure to
set- out the evidence upon which the trial court sustained the defendants'
motions for. a directed verdict did not require the dismissal of the plaintiff's
appeal, although the plaintiff could properly have disclosed, in the state-
ment in his brief, the evidence upon which the trial court sustained motions
for directed verdict for defendants.,'
Even if some matters stated in a brief are unnecessary, this does not
justify a dismissal of the appeal. Such a ruling would be entirely too
harsh.10'
c. Matters Considered on Appeal
An appellate court will not review errors which are not pointed out in
a brief filed by the appellant.
0 3
Under .Supreme Court Rule 3.21, objections to instructions shall be
made before the case is finally submitted to the jury. Under this rule
objections to instructions raised in the appellate court for the first time are
not properly before the court for review.1 4
d. Judgment on Appeal
1. Proper Judgment to Give
The appellate court is, by Section 140 of the General Code for Civil
Procedure, given direction to give such judgment as the trial court ought
to have given10'
Thus it is within the province of an appellate court to affirm or reverse
the judgment of the trial court or to give such judgment as the trial court
99. White v. Kuhnert, 207 S.W. 2d 839 (Mo. App. 1948).
100. Vance v. Vance, supra note 87.
101. Holmes v. McNeil, supra note 91.
102. Leath v. Weaver, supra note 98.
- 103. White v. Kuhnert, supra note 99. See also Supreme Court Rules 1.08
and 1.30.
104. Taylor v. Silver King Oil and Gas Co., 203 S.W. 2d 147 (Mo. App. 1947).
105. Hall v. Missouri Insurance Co., 208 S.W. 2d 830 (Mo. App. 1948).
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ought to have given and which the appellate court shall deem agreeable
to law.106
Where the appellant contended that the appellate court should reverse
a cause outright and direct the trial court to enter a judgment in favor of
defendant, the court said that it believed that justice required that it be
remanded for another trial where each party would be accorded a full
opportunity to present its evidence.107
2. Errors Not Affecting Merits of the Action
Under the General Code for Civil Procedure, Section 140(b), it is
provided that: "No appellate court shall reverse any judgment, unless it
believes that error was committed by the trial court against the appellant,
and materially affecting the merits of the action."
The court, during the past year, has several times held that errors
were not material.
Thus, in one case it held that argument outside of the record was
immaterial, where the trial court refused it grant a new trial on that
ground. 108
Where the trial court permitted hearsay testimony to be given by
the plaintiff when he said that the official he applied to for a position
on another railroad told plaintiff he would not hire plaintiff without a
service letter, it was held that this was not prejudicial error. The plaintiff
had already testified that the official had asked him for a service letter
and he answered he had none. Of greater moment was the fact that the
plaintiff was permitted later to testify without objection of any sort that,
when he applied for work on the same railroad at another division point,
the official there told him "I can't hire you without a service letter." The
court felt that it could not say that the jury relied on the testimony that
was challenged instead of that which was the same except for the form
of expression but was not challenged.' 09
Where damages were allowed by the jury, but were remitted by stip-
ulation after the verdict and before entry of the judgment, the inclusion
of the damages in the judgment was an obvious error, but it was not an
106. Boudinier v. Boudinier, supra note 68.
107. M. F. A. Farmers' Exchange of Carthage, Mo. v. Kurn, 205 S.W. 2d
878 (Mo. App. 1947). -
108. Wood v. Claussen, supra note 76.
109. Ackerman v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 558, 202 S.W. 2d 795 (1947).
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error that required a reversal of the judgment, but one that called for
correction which the appellate court could make.1"
When the appellant's counsel told the appellant to leave the court-
room with her child, the court should have told them promptly, then and
there, that his order did not require them to leave the courtroom. How-
ever, it was held that such error did not warrant a new trial, for nothing
in the record showed that appellant's absence from the courtroom prej-
udiced her case.:"'
3. Plain Error
The plaintiff appealed from a judgment which he contended was in
an insufficient amount, but the defendants did not appeal or even file a
motion for'a new trial. Though the appellate court determined on appeal
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery in any amount, it decided
that the defendants were not entitled to an outright reversal of judgment
under Supreme Court Rule 3.27, which provides that plain errors affecting
substantial rights may be considered on an appeal, though they are not
raised or preserved for review, or are defectively raised or preserved." 2L
4. Transfer from Court of Appeals
Where a court of appeals transfers a cause to the supreme court
because the result reached on one issue is deemed in conflict with a prin-
ciple of law announced by another court of appeals, the supreme court
determines the case as on an original appeal.
.13
Where an appeal was dismissed by a court of appeals, but the case
was certified to the supreme court because of a conflict of opinion with
another court of appeals as to whether the absence of a copy of a judg-
ment in the transcript was jurisdictional, the supreme court could rule on
the question and transfer the case back to the court of appeals. It was
not required to finally determine the cause.
1 4
110. Esker v. Davis, supra note 94.
111. Koeppel v. Koeppel, swpra note 7,8.
112. Loeb v. Viviano, supra note 66.
113. Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, supra note 66.
114. Lieffring v. Birt, supra note 3.
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